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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED N. HOBSON and MARY 
HOBSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
- vs-
PANGUITCH LAKE 
CORPORATION, ET AL., 
Defendants, Third-Party 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
- vs -
DERRAL CHRISTENSEN, ET AL., 
Third-Party Defendants, Fourth 
Party Plaintiffs, and Respondents, 
- vs-
DELLA D. MARSDEN, ET AL., 
Fourth-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF HOBSON RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
These Respondents (hereinafter referred to as "HOB-
SONS") brought this action against Appellant (herein-
after referred to as "PANGUITCH LAKE CORPORA-
TION") to quiet title to a tract of land, the west bound-
ary fence of which was torn down by Panguitch Lake 
Corporation's president in an effort to reconstruct that 
boundary to embrace the disputed tract within the latter's 
fence. In response to Hobson's lawsuit Panguitch Lake 
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Hobsons are not affected by, and their brief will not 
deal with, any of the disputes between the Third and 
Fourth Party Defendants, all of whom also appear as Re-
spondents. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court found that the predecessors in title 
to Panguitch Lake Corporation with Hobsons' approval 
had established the common boundary upon such courses 
and distances as entitled Hobsons to a Decree awarding 
them the disputed tract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Hobsons ask that the Decree quieting title in them 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1958 Fred Hobson bought two forty-acre tracts 
from William L. Marsden and Delia D. Marsden (R. 236) 
They are marked Tract 1 and Tract 2 on the plat below. 
The schematic drawing at page 3 of Appellants' brief 
is substantially correct but the northern and southern 
protrusions are exaggerated and extend into lands which 
do not influence, and are not affected by, this litigation 
so we have eliminated them from the reproduction below. 
The cross-hatched area roughly outlines the tract in dis-
pute and is a part of the Northwest quarter of the South-
west quarter of Section 31. The Marsden-Hobson fence-
line forms the West (diagonal) border of it. 
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Hobson met with Mr. and Mrs. Marsden together 
each time any purchase was discussed or transacted (R. 
254, 268, 270, 274, 297). William Marsden represented 
to Hobson, with Mrs. Marsden present, that he, William 
Marsden, owned the land at the time of Hobson's negotia-
tions to buy it (R. 252). 
At the trial it was stipulated that Mr. and Mrs. Mars-
den owned tracts 1 and 3 at all times material to these pro-
ceedings (R. 293-295) effectively disposing of the claim 
that Delia Marsden alone was the owner when the fence 
was constructed under direction of William Marsden. 
{This fact will be established by the evidence in treat-
ment of Panguitch Lake Corporation's Point I under our 
"Argument"} 
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Hobson didn't know where any of the corners or 
boundary lines were (R. 248) and told Marsden it was 
necessary that he know "right where my corners are going 
to be" (R. 146). Hobson wanted to get a surveyor but 
Marsden declined, saying that he "knew his land well" 
(R. 146). 
As Panguitch Lake Corporation acknowledges in its 
brief at Pages 4 and 5 a third party, Ralph Reynolds, took 
directions from Mr. Marsden who showed Reynolds where 
the west boundary of Hobson's acquisition was to be and 
where the common boundary between the parties was to 
be established and marked on the ground by the fence 
(R. 140-225). 
The boundary thus delineated is the diagonal (west) 
boundary on the sketch shown above. 
Mr. Marsden marked the west boundary of the Hob-
son property, directed the third party (Ralph Reynolds) 
where to drive the stakes and when the last stake along the 
north-south common boundary was driven Hobson and 
Marsden agreed completely that this would be the bound-
ary (R. 185). 
A substantial fence was constructed taking several 
weeks to complete after expensive materials were hauled 
into the the rather remote site (R. 185-188, 276). This 
fence became the anchor line for a mountain subdivision 
which Hobson established at considerable expense by a 
survey laid out and staked on the ground (R. 400) relying 
on and using the Marsden-established line as the west 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
boundary of Hobson's acquisition (R. 258, 259, 379, 383). 
Hobson, based upon these references to the established 
fence boundary, entered into contracts to sell lots and in 
selling lots showed the buyers "the ground" as it was 
staked in accordance with the subdivision plat which used 
the fence as the west boundary (R. 400, 401) but conveyed 
only two lots which was done prior to Panguitch Lake Cor-
poration taking down his fence (R. 401, 403, 404). Hob-
son paid taxes based on increased assessment (R. 402) and 
levy notices sent to him describing lots that were situated 
within this disputed tract of land (R. 265, 290, 403) and 
the fence remained on the Marsden-established course and 
boundary for a period of ten years until in 1968 when 
Oliver LeFevre unilaterally and without any notice to 
Hobson tore the fence down (R. 353, 354) after acquiring 
the forty-acre tract west of the fence from successors in 
interest of Marsden. 
Delia Marsden testified that she and her husband 
were horseback riding in the area two or three years after 
the fence was constructed and her husband "saw the fence 
and {said he} didn't like it" and he "wanted to get a 
surveyor up there and have the fence removed". She claims 
he did obtain the services of a surveyor for that purpose 
(R. 302); however, nothing was done by Marsden to at-
tempt to re-establish the fence nor was anything done by 
Marsdens' purchasers who acquired the adjoining tract of 
land under an escrow agreement in 1964 (R. 304). He 
never mentioned the problem to Hobson (R. 384) nor did 
his wife (R. 386). 
5 
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In June 1968 following the destruction by Panguitch 
Lake Corporation of Hobsons' west boundary fence, Hob-
son met Oliver LeFevre, President of Panguitch Lake Cor-
poration, at the site. Mr. Hobson was told the fenceline 
was not conforming to the sixteenth-quarter ("forty-acre" 
tract) line. He was told by a surveyor, David Bruce 
Whited, that there was a discrepancy between surveys. 
Whited asked the parties to agree that he was doing his 
surveying correctly and that he (the surveyor) had found 
the true boundary of the forty-acre tract (Lines 3-13, R. 
335). Whited testified: 
* * * I pointed out to them that there was this 
discrepancy and that this discrepancy should be 
agreed upon at this time so that I could proceed 
with my survey. 
# • • 
Q Was discussion had between Mr. LeFevre and 
Mr. Hobson about building a fence along that 
line? 
THE COURT: Now, you refer to what line? 
MR. EYRE: The dark blue line. 
A It was implied that there could have possibly 
— they didn't specifically state this line. The 
discussion that I heard was that the fence would 
be put on the boundary line. (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Hobson fairly stated exactly what took place (R. 
261) in a statement which is consistent of the testimony 
of all the other witnesses. He was asked: 
Q Did you agree to assist Mr. LeFevre of Pan-
guitch Lake Corporation putting in the fence-
line in accordance with Mr. Whited's survey 
line? 
6 
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A If that can be proven that that is correct, I 
would do anything fair. I said the line on the 
other side of the fence is mine but I also said 
that the surveyor, if he says that's the line, 
that's the line, but I didn't concede any land 
on the other side of the fence that I bought from 
William D. Marsden. 
Q So, you didn't agree that that's where the 
boundary line would be established and the 
fence placed? 
A No siree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS IMMATERIAL THAT DELLA D. MARS-
DEN MAY HAVE RECEIVED A CONVEY-
ANCE ON TRACTS 1 AND 3 BECAUSE — 
A. ALL PARTIES STIPULATED THAT 
BOTH WILLIAM AND DELLA MARS-
DEN OWNED THE LANDS AT ALL 
MATERIAL TIMES 
AND 
B. WILLIAM MARSDEN ACTED FOR 
HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE W I T H HER 
AUTHORITY IN ESTABLISHING A 
BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT 
The claim that Delia Marsden was the owner of 
Tracts 1 and 3 when her husband marked off and agreed 
to the boundary by parol with Fred Hobson is an after-
thought. It cannot be supported by the facts, as we will 
demonstrate under sub-point B, but was effectively de-
stroyed by pleadings and stipulation of all parties claim-
ing adversely to Hobsons in this lawsuit. 
7 
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A. ALL PARTIES STIPULATED THAT 
BOTH WILLIAM AND DELLA MARS-
DEN OWNED THE LANDS AT ALL 
MATERIAL TIMES 
The boundary was adopted by agreement of Marsden 
and Hobson in 1958 (R. 140 et. seq.). The pleadings at 
Page 58 of the record contain allegations not controvert-
ed by any person that the "Panguitch Lake Tract" (Parcel 
3) was purchased in 1964 from William and Delia Mars-
den (Lines 3-6) and that after the fence in question was 
constructed William and Delia Marsden did vigorously 
object thereto and hired a surveyor to conform where their 
boundary line was (Lines 13-15). Marsden's counsel 
answers the Fourth Party Complaint by referring to the 
land in question as "Fourth Party Defendants' [Mr. and 
Mrs. Marsden's} property" (R. 82). 
Transcendental to all this is a stipulation entered into 
by all parties found at R. 293-295 immediately prior to 
resting the Plaintiffs' case which is as follows: 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Just a minute, this will 
make a difference in the rest of my case. I will 
have to call some one of your parties who is here 
to establish who was the record owner of the 
northwest quarter of the southwest quarter of this 
Section 31, in 1958, either that or I'd like leave of 
the Court to get some certified copies of recorded 
instruments from the County Recorder's Office. 
Now, I understand from one of you or some of you 
that that property was in the name of William L. 
Marsden or Delia Marsden. 
MR. EYRE: We'll stipulate to that. 
MR. WADDINGHAM: Now, what do you want? 
8 
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MR. CHAMBERLAIN: The forty just west of 
Hobson. 
MR. EYRE: It actually wasn't the full forty, but 
the east thirty rods of it was. I'll stipulate to that 
in behalf of my client {Panguitch Lake Corpo-
ration}. 
THE COURT: The east thirty rods of the area 
that lies west of the forty? 
MR. EYRE: Yes. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: So that — do we have 
that stipulation completely from all counsel that 
the — 
MR. WADDINGHAM: We will stipulate that 
the property was purchased by these parties if that 
is the property we're talking about that was in the 
name of William and Delia. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Delia Marsden. 
MR. WADDINGHAM: I don't know if it was in 
their names as joint tenants or how it was vested 
but it was in both names. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: In August and Septem-
ber of 1958, is that correct? 
MR. EYRE: That's correct. We will stipulate 
to it. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: If that's true, then I 
won't have any other questions of Mr. Hobson. 
• * * 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Then with the stipula-
tion that the property lying immediately west of 
that in dispute and including the property in dis-
pute, that constitutes the northwest quarter of the 
southwest quarter of Section 31, in this township 
and range, and that on September, at the time criti-
9 
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cal to this litigation, in August and September 
1958, that was vested in the names of William L. 
Marsden and Delia D. Marsden, provided that that 
is the stipulation, then the Plaintiff rests. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: The Plaintiffs rest on 
the issue of title to the disputed fact question. 
The deed referred to in the first paragraph of Page 
4 of Appellants' brief was never in the record nor intro-
duced in evidence but was attached to a brief filed by Pan-
guitch Lake Corporation after the trial (R. 107-122). 
B. WILLIAM MARSDEN ACTED FOR HIM-
SELF AND HIS WIFE W I T H HER AU-
THORITY IN E S T A B L I S H I N G A 
BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT 
Mrs. Marsden appeared at the trial and testified as 
follows: 
{This examination is by her own counsel} 
R. 297 He {Mr. Marsden} said to me, "Look at 
that line," and I said, "What's the matter 
with it"? "Well," he said, "It is extend-
ed onto our property five or six miles 
(sic)," and I said, "Well, I can see it is 
out," so he said, "Would you like to ride 
up to the next corner?" 
R. 302 "Well, I certainly didn't indicate that he 
could have that little five acres because 
at that time we were selling little plots 
all over on the east side for much more 
money so he mentioned he would get 
Brownie Piatt up, which he did, and they 
were up there all day surveying that 
property." 
10 
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R. 309 Well, I very well recall my husband say-
ing that the land wasn't on the right line 
but I don't know that we had ever dis-
cussed it with Mr. Hobson. The only 
thing I know is that he had {her hus-
band} had it surveyed and he wanted it 
moved. 
Even more critical is the way the parties regarded 
ownership of the property, or whatever interests they con-
tinued to retain, in the property west of the land deeded 
to Hobson: 
R. 302 * * * at that same time we were selling 
little plots all over the east side for much 
more money, so he {her husband} men-
tioned he would get Brownie Piatt up 
which he did, and they {Mr. Marsden and 
Piatt} were out there all day surveying 
that property. 
Mrs. Marsden still regarded Mr. Marsden as the 
owner in fact of the property as well as her agent in re-
spect of any rights which she may have had. At R. 311 
she was asked by her own attorney: 
Q Mrs. Marsden, following his examination of the 
fence, did your husband do anything to re-
quire Mr. Hobson to remove the fence? 
A Well, due to the fact that he was ailing, he 
didn't follow things through quite so much 
and I couldn't tell you. 
In other words Mrs. Marsden claimed in her testi-
mony that the reason nothing was done about the fence 
during the period following 1958 (when the fence was 
constructed) was because her husband was "ailing". How 
11 
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can she deny that he was her agent and she was dependent 
upon him for complete management of her property while, 
at the same time, representing to the Court that there 
was an excuse in not doing anything about the fence be-
cause of Mr. Marsden's illness? 
At Page 306 the fact of Mr. Marsden's continuing 
ownership of the property or agency for Mrs. Marsden is 
even more apparent: 
Q When you were living in south Ogden, were 
you contacted by Mr. Thorpe Waddingham and 
other persons regarding the sale of property 
directly west of Hobson's property? 
A Well, we had quite a bit of ground there at that 
time and we knew he never could go back to 
do anything with his livestock and so we were 
anxious to get rid of it, really. It was a detri-
ment and things run down if you're not there 
and there were two or three people who wanted 
that ground. Mr. Waddingham had mentioned 
that he liked the property and he sent Mr. 
Christensen up to Ogden and we sold the prop-
erty. [This is the tract west of the disputed area 
and Waddingham and Christensen claimed 
(and Panguitch Lake claims under them) title 
to the disputed tract.} 
R. 307: 
Q Was there any question particularly with re-
gard to the fenceline that had been placed on 
the property west boundary by Mr. Hobson? 
A Well, naturally, my husband was very honest 
and he didn't want to sell this property without 
they understand this disputed line, so he told 
them that there were five acres of our choicest 
pasture ground which was fenced within the 
12 
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boundaries of Mr. Hobson's land and Mr. 
Christensen said, "Oh, that's alright. We'l l 
go burn that fence down." 
POINT II 
TITLE TO THE DISPUTED LAND WAS 
PROPERTY QUIETED IN HOBSONS BY THE 
TRIAL COURT BECAUSE HOBSON'S TITLE 
WAS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DOC-
TRINE OF BOUNDARY BY PAROL 
Immediately after Hobsons' acquisition William 
Marsden located the boundary on which the fenceline was 
built by directing a third party (Ralph Reynolds) where 
to stake off the line (R. 140-225) on which line Hobson 
built the fence (R. 185-188, 246, 276). 
At the time this fenceline was located, Hobson did 
not know where the true west boundary of his acquisition 
was (R. 248, 290) and neither did Marsden because he 
located the line trending southwesterly rather than due 
south (see foregoing plat)* 
After Marsden had directed Hobson's employee 
where to place the stakes, both parties agreed this would 
be the boundary (R. 185, 242). 
Brown vs. Milliner, 120 U 16, 232 P2d 202, in a 
comprehensive opinion by Chief Justice Wolfe reviewing 
the history of the rule states: 
A review of the Utah cases involving boundary dis-
putes reveals that it has long been recognized in 
this state that when the location of the true bound-
ary between two adjoining tracts of land is un-
13 
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known, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof 
may, by parol agreement, establish the boundary 
line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and 
their grantees. 
The decision then quotes Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37 
U 99, 107 P 25 and Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 U 57, 267 P 912, 
69 ALR 1417. 
That case goes on to hold further that a boundary 
by agreement will be presumed by long use or acquies-
cence in a fence. 
This case has been affirmed and cited with approval 
for the first proposition in all of the following cases: 
Willie vs. Local Realty Co., 175 P2d 718 {175 P2d at 
723}, 110 Utah 523 
(Cites Tripp vs. Bagley that one of the requisites 
necessary to the establishment of a boundary line 
other than the true boundary line between adjoin-
ing landowners is by oral agreement or acquies-
cence.) 
Ekberg vs. Bates, 239 P2d 205, 121 U 122 
Hummel vs. Young, 265 P2d 410, 1 U2d 237 
Ringwood vs. Bradford, 269 P2d 1053, 2 U2d 119 
(Holding that if no such agreement can be proved, 
then such an agreement will be implied by long 
acquiescence) 
Jensen vs. Bartlett, 286 P2d 804, 4 U2d 58 
14 
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To attach the requirement of acquiescence to the rule 
of boundary by agreement announced in those landmark 
cases is an absurd extention of the rule because boundary 
by long acquiescence does no more than to create a pre-
sumption that an agreement existed. If an agreement can-
not establish a boundary, then upon what theory can 
acquiescence create a presumption that an agreement has 
been honored over a long period of time? 
In 3 Utah Law Review at Page 504 there is a state-
ment to the effect that: 
There is a theoretical argument against acquies-
cence as a requirement since in the law of bound-
ary by acquiescence, the line established is held 
to be binding on adjoining land owners when an 
agreement is "implied" and unrebutted. The exist-
ence of an actual agreement should be sufficient 
in itself to bind the parties to the determined 
property." 
The note goes on to say that a persuasive practical 
argument against this theory can be made; however, an 
examination of that theory will show that it is neither 
persuasive nor practical because it only states that land-
owners could, by an act of collusion, avoid the Statute of 
Frauds. 
These important cases of Brown vs. Milliner, Rydalch 
vs. Anderson and Tripp vs. Bagley all destroy that theory 
since boundary by mutual agreement is not a transfer of 
land but an agreement establishing the respective estates 
of the adjoining proprietors. 
15 
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Panguitch Lake Corporation relies on the statement 
by Mr. Chief Justice Callister concurring in the result in 
Davis vs. Riley, 20 U2d 325, 437 P2d 453; however, 
Counsel has misinterpreted His Honor's statement which 
is as follows: 
This doctrine (of boundary by acquiescence} is 
premised on either an express parol agreement by 
adjoining owners fixing the boundary or the court 
will imply such an agreement by indulging in the 
fiction that at some time in the past adjoining own-
ers were in dispute or uncertain as to the location 
of the true boundaries and they settled their dif-
ferences by agreeing upon the fence or other monu-
ment as the dividing line between their properties. 
In Hummel vs. Young, 1 U2d 237, 265 P2d 410, 
Justice Crockett appropriately concurred in the result by 
agreeing that an express contract is not necessary to the 
establishment of a boundary line by acquiescence, a clear 
holding that the period of long acquiescence supplies a 
deficiency in an effort to prove boundary by parol (such 
as lack of uncertainty, unavailability of parties to agree, 
etc.) 
Beginning at Page 15 of its brief, Panguitch Lake 
Corporation agrees as sort of a subsidiary — though not 
identified — proposition that the 1958 fence line was 
established by mistake—both parties mistakenly believ-
ing they were on the true boundary. That theory is dis-
posed of by Nunley vs. Walker, 369 P2d 117, 13 U2d 105, 
holding that a boundary will be established by agreement 
even though the parties could have ascertained the true 
boundary by a survey but did not. See also Hummel vs. 
Young 1 U2d 237, 265 P2d 410 and Motzkus vs. Carroll, 
7 U2d237,322P2d391. 
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Mr. Justice Henriod expressed the arch-type case 
which fits this situation: 
It is significant that in most cases, a physical, visi-
ble means of marking the boundary was effected at 
a time when it was cheaper to risk the mistake of 
a few feet rather than to argue about it, go to the 
court, or indulge the luxury of a survey, pursuance 
of any of which motives might have proven more 
costly than the possible and most expedient sacri-
fice of the small land area. 
This is precisely Mr. Marsden's predicament. 
The Trial Court believed (and there was absolutely 
no evidence to the contrary) that Marsden established this 
boundary line; Marsden and Hobson agreed to it, shook 
hands upon it, and Hobson relied on it to his tremendously 
devastating damage if it is now changed, by building a 
substantial fence which stood for ten years, tying an ex-
pensive subdivision to it, and selling lots to innocent third 
persons (on contract) out of it. 
If Hobsons do not prevail in this action, those indi-
viduals can sue Hobsons for substantial damages if he is 
unable to perform under those contracts. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND 
THAT NO ORAL AGREEMENT EXISTED TO 
TRANSFER TITLE FROM HOBSONS TO 
PANGUITCH LAKE 
The Court in the last part of Finding No. 9 and Find-
ing No. 10 made this ruling: 
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{R. 94] 
# 9 * * * The west boundary of said tract was 
established by act of the parties in 1958 and by the 
express consent and agreement of William Marsden 
w h o * * * directing Ralph Reynolds to establish 
stakes in the ground marking the course and dis-
tance of the west boundary of the tract sold along 
which course Hobsons subsequently constructed a 
fence which fence remained in that position until 
the same was destroyed without authority and by 
the wrongful act of Oliver LeFevre. 
# 1 0 : 
The Court finds that all subsequent conduct on 
the part of the Plaintiffs and successors in interest 
of Marsden did not constitute a reconveyance of the 
disputed tract of land nor did any of those acts or 
that conduct serve to relocate the fence nor author-
ize a re-establishment of the west boundary of the 
Hobson tract nor did it effect any rescission of the 
boundary line established and created by the act 
of the parties in 1958 {Emphasis added} 
Panguitch Lake Corporation contends that this is in 
essence a conclusion of law. This is contrary to the ex-
press language of the finding where the Court says that the 
subsequent conduct did not serve to relocate the fence and 
there were no facts by which there was authorized a re-
establishment of the west boundary. In other words the 
Court accepted the version of Hobson that he did not au-
thorize a change in the boundary by any statement, act or 
conduct. The Trial Court also accepted the statement of 
the surveyor, Whited, that the parties agreed that the 
survey was proceeding correctly and that the surveyor was 
accurately marking the west boundary of the forty-acre 
tract (R. 336). "They didn't specifically state this line (the 
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"40" boundary). The discussion that I heard was that the 
fence would be put on the boundary line". [The fence 
had been torn down — Hobson wanted it put back up on 
the legal boundary — conceding nothing over the fence.} 
(R.261). 
Here in the year 1968 there was absolutely no doubt 
concerning application of these various descriptions to 
the physical features on the ground. It was not a situation 
where they needed the services of a surveyor. A surveyor 
was there (R. 260-68). The interest of Hobson in the 
disputed tract became vested in 1958 when he and Mars-
den established that boundary by parol. Nothing was left 
to dispute about that nor was the location of the f enceline 
uncertain. The parties were standing on it. If the sur-
veyor pointed out that this fence was not on the line, then 
this did not raise an uncertainty or a dispute as to the ulti-
mate fact, i.e.: there was nothing requiring any agree-
ment between the parties in 1968 as to an uncertainty or 
a dispute. Under these circumstances if Hobson had de-
sired to convey the disputed tract back to Panguitch Lake 
Corporation he would have been required to do so in 
compliance with the Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
See Carter vs. Lindner, 460 P2d 830, 23 U2d 204. 
See also Motzkus vs. Carroll, 322 P2d 391, 7 U2d 
237. This case holds subordinately (1) as a long period of 
acquiescence is established it is not necessary to prove also 
that the location of the true boundary was unknown, un-
certain or in dispute [Thus distinguishing very clearly the 
two separate theories}. And holds pre-eminently (2) that 
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where a boundary line has been established and rights 
vested prior to a survey, whether that establishment took 
place in 7 or 20 years or immediately, it is immaterial 
that a person then owning the disputed tract may consent 
to the removal of the fence or does not protest when the 
surveyor shows where he located the boundary line, for 
such knowledge does not nullify the establishment of a 
boundary line by acquiescence or agreement which had 
been completed before the survey. 
If the evidence taken as a whole can be susceptible 
of opposite conclusions as to the existence or non-existence 
of a determinative fact or the weight to be given the testi-
mony of witnesses, the reviewing Court will conclusively 
presume the fact to be such as will support the ruling it 
is called upon to review. Pollesche vs. Trans-American 
Insurance Co., 497 P2d 236, 27 U2d 430. 
The Trial Court had the option to conclude from the 
evidence that Fred Hobson never agreed in 1968 that the 
fence could be removed from the location where he had 
placed it and the only interpretation the Court could 
possibly have placed on his statement was that if the law 
required him to remove the fence, then it should be placed 
on the line fixed by the licensed surveyor (R. 261). 
Even if the Court indulged the presumption or in-
dulged in the speculation that Hobson entered into an 
agreement to move the fenceline, then that would not 
comport with the requirements of boundary by parol for 
the reason that there was no dispute as to the relationship 
of legal descriptions to physical features of the land. 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
To illustrate this, the reason for boundary by parol, 
as expressed by Justice Henroid in King vs. Fronk, 14 
U2d 135, 378 P2d 893, is that the parties wished to avoid 
the expense and inconvenience and delay of obtaining a 
professional surveyor or to obtain the scientifically estab-
lished and certain method of determining where the 
boundary line is or should be marked on the ground. It is 
never invoked (the rule of boundary by parol) because 
the descriptions in the deeds, conveyances, patents, or 
other muniments of title are uncertain. It is only invoked 
because of difficulty in applying those descriptions em-
ployed in muniments of title to the ground itself. Thus, 
when individuals agree on a boundary line and 
bind themselves and their successors to it {Brown vs. 
Milliner, 120 U 16, 232 P2d 202) they are, in effect, mak-
ing a practical, contemporaneous, interpretation or con-
struction of their instruments of title which themselves are 
clear but which may mean two or more different things 
when translated to actual, physical establishment of a 
boundary (R. 261). 
The Court made an express finding that Hobson 
never authorized or agreed to a new boundary (Finding 
No. 10, R. 94). Even if we were to indulge Panguitch 
Lake Corporation's characterization of that finding as a 
"conclusion" nevertheless the judgment should be sustain-
ed where there is evidence to support that conclusion. 
Crissey vs. State Highway Commission, 413 P2d 308, 147 
Mont. 374, holds that a reviewing court will imply find-
ings necessary to support a conclusion so long as those 
they imply are not inconsistent with findings expressly 
made. 
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This Court in Aiken vs. Less Taylor Motor Co., 110 
V 265, 171 P2d 676, held: 
Whether or not a new agreement fof lease] was 
made we do not know. Lessor contends it was. 
Lessee denies making any new tenancy agreement. 
The trial court made no finding of fact specifically 
on the question. The court determined that the 
lessee was in possession under the lease so renew-
ed. From that determination it may be inferred 
that the court did not agree with the lessor that a 
new agreement was made or if made that it affect-
ed the renewed lease. 
Whenever, from facts found, other facts may be in-
ferred which will support the judgment, such inferences 
will be deemed to have been drawn by the Trial Court. 
Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. vs. FTC (CA 7th) 168 F2d 
175 (affd. 336 US 956, 69 SCt. 888, 93 L.Ed. 1110). 
Furthermore, Panguitch Lake Corporation (and all 
those others claiming adversely to Hobson) specifically re-
quested the Court to make a finding that a parol agree-
ment was reached in June 1968 and to find expressly that 
Hobson agreed to establishment of a new boundary along 
the line which Whited said was "splitting the difference" 
between the two professional surveys (R. 100, par. 5; R. 
104, par. 5). The Court refused to make these findings 
after a hearing held upon the motion (R. 124, 125). 
Refusal of the Trial Court to adopt requested findings 
must be regarded on appeal as a finding against the party 
who requested the findings. (Gallegos vs. War, 78 N.M. 
796, 438 P2d 636). 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Additionally, Panguitch Lake Corporation had the 
burden of proving boundary by parol under their claim 
that one occurred in 1968 (Universal Investment Co. vs. 
Kingsbury, 26 U2d 35, 484 P2d 173) and if there were a 
failure of the Trial Court to make a finding upon the issue 
(which we dispute because the Court found expressly 
against Panguitch Lake on the issue) on review that failure 
would be regarded as a negative finding against Pan-
guitch Lake. The failure of a Trial Court to make a find-
ing upon an issue, the burden of proving which is upon a 
party, is in effect a negative factual finding on that issue. 
Ingle vs. Ingle, 183 Wash. 234, 48 P2d 576. 
In First Western Fidelity vs. Gibbons and Reed Co., 
27 U2d 1, 492 P2d 132, Justice Crockett held: 
In addition to and supplementing the usual rule 
of review on appeal, that we survey the evidence in 
the light favorable to the Trial Court's findings, 
this further comment is applicable here. Where 
the appellant's position is that the Trial Court 
erred in refusing to make certain findings essential 
to its right to recover, and insists that the evidence 
compels such findings, it is obliged to show that 
there is credible and uncontradicted evidence 
which proves those contended facts with such cer-
tainty that all reasonable minds must so find. Con-
versely, if there is any reasonable basis, either in 
the evidence or from the lack of evidence upon 
which reasonable minds might conclude that they 
are not so convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence, then the findings should not be over-
turned. 
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CONCLUSION 
We believe this eminent statement of the scope and 
effect of review applies to all the findings of the Trial 
Court. Panguitch Lake Corporation has failed, and can 
only fail because of the record, to demonstrate any finding 
or any conduct on the part of the Trial Court in refusing 
to find any facts where the Trial Court's action was not 
supported by substantial evidence. Nor can Panguitch 
Lake Corporation show any error of the Trial Court in 
applying the law to the findings and conclusions thus 
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